Colorado Criminal Procedure - Does it Meet the Minimum Standards? by Scott, Austin W., Jr.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 5 
June 2021 
Colorado Criminal Procedure - Does it Meet the Minimum 
Standards? 
Austin W. Scott Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Colorado Criminal Procedure - Does it Meet the Minimum Standards?, 28 Dicta 14 
(1951). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
14 DICTA Vol. 28
COLORADO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DOES IT
MEET THE MINIMUM STANDARDS?
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.
Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law
The American Bar Association at its annual meeting in 1938
made a number of specific recommendations for the improvement
of the administration of justice in the United States.' Although
these recommendations are not limited to matters of judicial pro-
cedure,2 most of them do deal with procedure, both civil and crimi-
nal. It is the purpose of this article to examine the American Bar
Association's recommendations for the improvement of criminal
procedure, and to see to what extent Colorado complies with the
recommended procedure in this field.
3
The recommendations in question do not purport to cover pro-
cedure in any detail. Instead they pick out a few items considered
really essential to the proper administration of justice in modern
times-items which, while they represent the minimum require-
ments for achieving justice, are yet of a practical, rather than
simply theoretical or academic, nature.
4
The first recommendation of the American Bar Association,
"that practice and procedure in the courts should be regulated
by rules of court; and that to this end the courts should be given
full rule-making powers," is called the "keystone" of the associa-
tion's program for reform of judicial procedure. 5 This recom-
' These recommendations, as well as the committee reports on which they were
based, may be found in 63 A.B.A_ REP. 522-656 (1938), and in VANDERBILT, MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 505-624 (1949). The history of these recommen-
dations is as follows: The ABA's Section of Judicial Administration undertook to make
specific recommendations for reform of judicial administration. It obtained the services
of seven committees of distinguished lawyers, judges and professors to report on seven
principal sub-topics (judicial administration; pre-trial procedure; trial practice; selec-
tion of jurors; law of evidence; appellate practice; and administrative agencies). These
committees made specific proposals to the section, which adopted most of them in its
recommendations to the House of Delegates. The House adopted all these recommenda-
tions at the annual convention.
I They include recommendations for improvement of justice (1) through better
selection of judges; (2) through better integration of the judiciary by the establishment
of judicial councils, administrative offices, administrative judges, etc. ; and (3) through
improvement of administrative tribunals and practice. As to the methods of selection of
judges in Colorado, and their conformity to A.B.A. standards, see Van Cise, The Colo-
rado Judicial System-Can it and Should it be Improved?, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 142
(1950).
' Two recent publications are very helpful for understanding the ABA's minimum
standards and the reasons therefor, and for seeing how far each of the states complies
with these standards. They are: VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1 supra; and AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1949) a handbook
prepared by the Section of Judicial Administration. I have one criticism of both works
(and indeed of the wording of the ABA recommendations) : they do not always make
clear which recommendations apply to criminal procedure as well as to civil procedure.
For instance, does the recommendation for pre-trial conferences, or that for partial new
trials, apply to criminal as well as civil cases?
4 Judge Vanderbilt lays great stress on the fact that the recommendations deal with
minimum standards of practical application, and not something academic and utopian.
VANDERBILT, OP. cit. note 1, at xxviii.
I A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3 supra, at 8. By the rule-making power, a some-
what ambiguous expression, the ABA means: (1) A complete power, not merely a
power to supplement legislative rules of procedure. In case of conflict between legisla-
tive rule and court rule, the latter prevails. (2) A supervisory power in one court-the
court of last resort-to make rules governing procedure in other courts. VANDERBILT,
op. cit note 1, at 92, 94.
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mendation is not, of course, limited to the field of civil procedure
but embraces criminal procedure as well. 6 Colorado lawyers are
familiar with the state legislature's statutory recognition in 1939
of the Colorado Supreme Court's right to prescribe rules of pro-
cedure for civil cases in the Colorado courts, 7 soon thereafter fol-
lowed by the court's adoption in 1941 of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Colorado legislature has in recent times
passed no such statute relative to the rule-making power of the
court over criminal procedure.
RULE-MAKING POWER INHERENT IN COURTS
It is doubtless true that the Colorado Supreme Court may
properly promulgate rules of criminal procedure without such a
statute. The regulation of procedure in the courts is inherently
a judicial rather than a legislative function,8 and this power to
regulate has not been lost through abandonment merely because
the court has not exercised it as much as it might have done.9
Furthermore, the Colorado constitution specifically provides that
the Supreme Court has "a general superintending control over all
inferior courts;" 10 this provision is broad enough to include the
rule-making power." Lastly, the Colorado legislature as long ago
as 1913 expressly recognized the Supreme Court's right to pre-
scribe rules of criminal procedure. 12 It might be well, however,
for the Colorado legislature to enact a statute at the instigation
of the Colorado Bar Association expressly conferring on the Su-
preme Court the rule-making power in the criminal field.
There are many advantages to court-made rules of procedure
over legislature-made rules. Courts know more about procedure
than do members of the legislature. They can better withstand
harmful influences by interested groups. They can make needed
changes from time to time more quickly and easily than can the
legislature. Legislative changes are almost always piece-meal,
patchwork affairs, but the courts may promulgate a well-rounded,
complete, cohesive set of rules. The truth of this last statement
may be tested by comparing the present confusing state of the
law of criminal procedure in Colorado, contained in various scat-
tered statutes, Supreme Court decisions and unwritten practices
a See A.B.A. HANDBOOK, op. cit. note 3, at 12. Note that the United States Con-
gress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of criminal procedure, 54 STAT.
688 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1948) in a separate statute from that authorizing rules
of civil procedure, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948). The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure became effective on Mar. 21, 1946, seven years after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.
'COLO. LAWS 1939, p. 264.
VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 132-134. The Colorado Supreme Court has
so held : Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
9 See Kolkman v. People, note 8 supra.
CoL~o. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
11 Kolkman v. People, note 8 supra. VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 135-6.
12 COLO. LAWS 1913, p. 447. The statute provides that the Colorado Supreme Court
may make rules of procedure in all courts of record, which rules shall supersede any
statute in conflict therewith. While not expressly *mentioning criminal procedure, it
includes it by inference, since it is not limited to civil procedure.
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in trial courts,13 with the much shorter and simpler but more com-
plete statement of the law in the new Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The power to make rules of criminal procedure is not, of
course, an end in itself but only a means to an end; that is, a
means of improving the administration of justice in criminal cases.
The court, having such a power, must take some action. What
action? It should appoint a committee of lawyers to draw up rules
of criminal procedure, as it did for the rules of civil procedure.
14
It seems clear that, with very little actual change in Colorado
criminal procedure, much can be done to simplify, consolidate and
make more certain the present law, to prune away some obsolete
provisions and to incorporate some of the procedural changes rec-
ommended by the American Bar Association, 15 which are to be
discussed in the remainder of this article. The rules committee
would have the great benefit of having not only the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, but also the American Law Institute Code' 6
and these American Bar Association recommendations, to serve
as aids in formulating the best possible rules of criminal procedure.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES
The American Bar Association recommended that trial courts
should utilize the pre-trial conference, especially in metropolitan
areas.'7 It is not clear whether this recommendation is meant to
apply to criminal, as well as civil, cases. It would seem to be a
useful device in the criminal field, to achieve, for instance, a sim-
plification of the issues, or to obtain possible admissions of fact
or of documents and thus avoid the necessity of proof at the trial.
It has sometimes been used in criminal cases in other states.', The
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
proposed a pre-trial conference in criminal cases, based on Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 but the United States
Supreme Court omitted the provision when it adopted the Rules.
Colorado apparently has no provision for pre-trial conferences in
criminal cases.
There has in recent times been a good deal of criticism of the
institution of trial by jury. Many persons, especially laymen, be-
lieve that the jury trial today is not a search for truth and justice
at all, but rather a contest between lawyers endeavoring to fool
the jury into giving a favorable verdict. If this ancient institution
is to survive in modern times, it must serve as a proper instru-
'3 See Scott, Criminal Procedure in Colorado-A Summary; and Recommendations
for Improvement, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 221, 246 (1950).
14 The methods used successfully by the Colorado Supreme Court in preparing civil
rules, by appointing a committee to prepare a draft, followed by an invitation to mem-
bers of bench and bar to submit criticisms, were substantially those used by the United
States Supreme Court to draw up the Federal Rules both of Civil and Criminal Pro-
cedure.
15 That is the recommendations of 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 (1938). cited at note 1, supra.
'sAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930).
" 63 A.B.A. REP. at 523 (1938).
"ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM.\T ARREST TO APPEAL, 323-4 (1947).
"Similar to COLO. R. CIv. P. 16 (1941).
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ment for achieving justice. The American Bar Association lays
great stress on the necessity for improving the caliber of the jury
panel through improved methods of selecting jurors, in most states
a very haphazard affair. While it is important not to discriminate
against any social, economic, religious or racial group in selecting
jurors, it is equally important to get intelligent, sensible, high-
minded persons for jury service.
The first recommendation as to jury selection is that "jurors
should be selected by commissioners appointed by the courts" 20
on a non-partisan basis. Colorado fulfills this "minimum stand-
ard" only in part: for counties over 40,000 in population it is
true2 ; for counties of smaller size jury selection is made by county
commissioners.
22
Since the primary purpose of the jury commissioner system
is to improve the caliber of the jury, "the commissioner should
have authority to send out questionnaires, conduct personal inter-
views, give intelligence tests and use other procedures to determine
the fitness of those under consideration; and, of course, he should
have sufficient funds and clerical assistance to enable him to do
a thorough job." 23 The Colorado laws allow the jury commissioner
to send questionnaires and conduct personal interviews as to the
qualifications of prospective jurors, 24 but do not direct or author-
ize a thorough investigation of their general fitness for the task.
DISCRETIONARY POWER IN JUDGE PREFERRED
While the American Bar Association in its 1938 recommenda-
tion did not cover this matter, it has since adopted, as part of its
program of law reform, the recommendation of the Knox commit-
tee on jury selection to the effect that state jury laws should pro-
vide for a liberal standard of qualifications for jury service with
few exemptions, with discretion in the trial judge to excuse par-
ticular individuals or groups from serving. 25 Colorado is one of
the few states which substantially follow this Knox recommenda-
tion.2
6
One bad feature of the Colorado law on jury selection is the
statutory provision, explaining the duties of the jury selection
officials, to the effect that these officials shall list only those quali-
fied persons who are not exempt.2 7 In effect this disqualifies the
exempt persons, although exempt persons are qualified even though
they need not serve if they do not wish .
2
Two other recommendations of the American Bar Association
20 63 A.B.A. REP, at 525 (1938).
2' COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 95, §§ 22, 36 (1935).
2Id. § 10, as amended by COLO. LAWS 1943, p. 390.
23A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3, supra, at 63.
24 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, §§ 26, 40 (1935).
1 A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3. suprao. at 62.
7COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, § 1 (1935), as amended by COLO. LAWS 1945, p. 426
(repealing C. 95, H9 3-9). Some exemptions are found scattered about in the statutes,
e.g. id. c. 95, § 15, exempting those who served within a year; id. c. 111, §§ 23, 136 (as
amended) exempting national and state guardsmen.
7Id. c. 95, §§ 10 (as amended by COLO. LAWS 1943, p. 390), 25, 39.
m Criticized in VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 171.
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have to do with juries. First, the proposal that on the examination
of jurors on their voir dire the procedure of Rule 47 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-having the initial questioning of jurors
done by the trial judge, and giving him control over later question-
ing by counsel-should be followed. This procedure, designed to
avoid delay in selecting the trial jury, is not followed in civil cases
in Colorado, 2f nor is there any authority for it in Colorado crimi-
nal cases. Second, the proposal that alternate jurors be impanelled
in order to avoid mistrials as a result of the death or unavoidable
absence of a regular juror during a long trial. Colorado fulfills
this "minimum standard" in criminal,30 as well as civil, 31 cases.
The important problem of improving the administration of
justice by the selection of jurors of higher quality is, of course,
only partly a question of changing the law. Most of the results
must be achieved through more business-like practices of the jury
selection officials, coupled with a greater recognition by the public
of their duty to aid in the administration of justice by serving
as jurors, rather than thinking of excuses not to serve.
TRIAL PRACTICE
The American Bar Association makes a number of recom-
mendations in this general field. The most important of these are
aimed at restoring the power of the trial judge to what it was at
common law, by (1) allowing him to give oral instructions to the
jury after argument by counsel and (2) giving him the power, in
instructing the jury, of "summarizing and analyzing the evidence
and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the evidence
or upon any part of it, always leaving the final decision on ques-
tions of fact to the jury." 32 These powers are, of course, nothing
new and revolutionary, but rather of ancient origin. 33 The Amer-
ican Bar Association felt strongly that possession of these powers
by the trial judge is necessary for the proper administration of
justice, i. e., the reaching of a just result.34 The right to analyze
and comment on the evidence is necessary at times when counsel
deliberately try to cloud the issues or play on the emotions of the
jurors. Written instructions are singularly unenlightening, and
their usefulness is often greatly diminished if followed by, rather
than following, arguments of counsel.
In this area of procedure, both civil and criminal, Colorado
measures up badly. In civil cases the judge may not comment on
the evidence; it is expressly forbidden by the Colorado Rules of
' COLO. R. Civ. P. 47(a) (1941), allowing counsel to question the Jurors without
court permission.
S COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, § 21 (1935).
"Id. Also Co Lo. R. Civ. P. 47(b) (1941).
63 A.B.A. REP at 523.
"VANDERBILT, Op. Cit. note 1, at 224-5.
'4 The same proposals are made in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE, RULE 8 (1942), and in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
§ 325 (1930). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 30, provide for Instructions after argument. Comment on the
evidence has always been allowed in practice in civil and criminal cases in Federal
courts, although not expressly mentioned in the Federal rules.
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Civil Procedure. 35 While there is no statute or rule expressly for-
bidding comment in criminal cases, such is probably the present
law in Colorado3 6 Instructions are given in writing, rather than
orally, in both civil 37 and criminal 38 cases, and the instructions
precede, rather than follow, arguments of counsel.3 9
As the American Bar Association has pointed out, "These
changes will not automatically produce a just verdict in every case.
But they will make it more likely that a right verdict will be re-
turned." 40 Colorado should take action to improve its procedure
in this area.
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY RECOMMENDED
The ABA makes some other recommendations in the field of
trial practice, some of which may be applicable to criminal trials.
One recommendation is for the authorized use of special interroga-
tories to the jury along with the general verdict.4 1  Colorado,
although it authorizes the use of such special verdicts in civil
cases,42 makes no such provision as to criminal cases. It is allowed
in some states for criminal cases.43 Doubtless its use in both civil
and criminal cases may help to make juries decide according to the
law, preventing them from taking the law into their own hands. 44
Another recommendation is that trial courts should have the
power, after verdict, of granting a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, in accordance with an original motion for
directed verdict.4  This would save the time and expense of an
unnecessary new trial. Colorado follows this recommendation in
civil cases.4 6 On principle, the rule should apply equally to crimi-
nal cases, where the evidence on behalf of the prosecution, even
if assumed to be true, is insufficient to prove that the defendant
committed the crime charged, but the trial judge erroneously has
refused to direct a verdict of acquittal. After verdict of guilty,
the judge could grant a new trial because of the insufficiency of
the evidence; but why should there be a new trial at all? The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure give the trial judge this
" COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941). The 1939 statute, note 7 supra, authorizing the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure, provides "that no rule shall be made
permitting or allowing trial judges to comment on the evidence given on the trial." For
a similar restraint, see also COLO. LAWS 1913, p. 447.
See Scott, note 13 supra, at 239-40.
"COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941).
Coio. STAT. ANN., C. 48, § 491 (1935). If both parties agree, the instructions, sub-
mitted to the judge in writing. may be given by him orally. Id. § 492.
"Id. c. 48, § 491 (criminal) ; COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941) (civil).
"A.B.A. I-ANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3 supra, at 53.
"63 A.B.A. REP. at 524 (1938).
"COLO. R. Civ. P. 49 (1941).
a See ORFIELD, op. cit. note 18 supra, 472-3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 337, 341-2 (1930), provides for special verdicts. They were
allowed in criminal cases at common law. Id. p. 1000-1. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure are silent on the question.
'4 "The general verdict Is an escape-valve from the hardships of fixed law, but it
can be abused when juries disregard the law generally and follow prejudice and per-
sonal favor." A.B.A. HANDBOOK, op. cit. note 3 supra, at 53.
63 A.B.A. REP. at 524 (1938). This, of course, is not the old common law motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which raised questions as to the sufficiency
of the pleadings but not of the evidence.
"COLO. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (1941). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (1939).
power,47 and a number of states allow this procedure in criminal
cases.48 Although there is nothing in the Colorado statutes ex-
pressly giving the Colorado trial judge in a criminal case this
power, very likely he nevertheless does have such a power.
49
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
We have already considered under the heading "trial prac-
tice" one or two of the ABA recommendations dealing with evi-
dence, such as the trial judge's power to comment on the evidence.
Some other proposals are made, however, for reforming the rules
of evidence in the interests of better administration of justice.5 °
These proposals are applicable to evidence in both civil and crimi-
nal cases.
One rather general but basic recommendation is that more
than mere error in the admission or rejection of evidence should
be required for the granting of a new trial by an appellate court.
There must also be some showing that, on the whole record, the
error resulted in prejudice to the losing party. This is the Colo-
rado law in both civil 51 and criminal 52 cases. Another recom-
mendation is that formal exceptions to the trial court's adverse
rulings on evidence should not be a prerequisite for review on appeal.
Colorado clearly does not require exceptions in civil cases, 53 but
the law is not stated clearly as to criminal cases.
54
The other proposals for reforming the law of evidence deal
with certain specific rules picked out from the total body of rules
of evidence as particularly needing change.55 It is worthy of note
that the reform of evidence is not really a matter for a committee
drafting rules of procedure, 56 but is such a special job that it
should be done as a separate venture.
57
One of the ABA's recommendations concerning appellate prac-
tice 58 is that, to avoid unnecessary expenditures of time and money,
appeals from inferior courts by trials de novo in a superior court
be abolished, and justice of the peace courts either be done away
with or improved. Colorado, of course, has a system of justice
courts, and in criminal cases a defendant convicted in the justice
court may appeal to the county court, where a trial de novo is had.5 9
4, FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (1946).
48 see ORFIELD, op. cit. note 18 supra. at 436.
,9 The Colorado Supreme Court may reverse and remand with directions to sustain a
motion to acquit and discharge the defendant, where the evidence on the state's part is
so defective that the trial judge should have directed a verdict. E.g Matthews v. People,
89 Colo. 421, 3 P. 2d 409 (1931). See Scott, note 13 supra, at 244-5. This being so, it
should follow that the trial judge can give judgment of acquittal after verdict of guilty,
where the evidence is so defective that the trial judge should have directed a verdict.
5163 A.B.A. REP. at 525-527 (1938).
Z COLO. R. Civ. P. 61 (1941) ("harmless error").
52 See Scott, note 13 svpra, at 244. Accord as to harmless error in federal criminal
cases, see FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(a) (1946).
53COLO. R. Civ. P. 46 (1941).
54Probably formal exceptions are not necessary. See Scott, note 13 supra, at 238.
55E.g. privileged communications; deceased person's statements; proof of business
records ; the opinion rule ; certified copies of court records.
M Thus the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure do not deal in any way with the specific rules of evidence.
.7 The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (1942) would be a natural
starting point in any venture of this kind.
563 A.B.A. REP. 527-9 (1938).
iiCOLO. STAT. ANN., c. 96 § 165 (1935).
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The recent attempts by the Colorado Bar Association to bring
about these recommended reforms 60 have not as yet borne fruit,
but a further attempt to carry them out may be expected.
Another recommendation deals with the superior qualities of
a simple notice of appeal, as distinguished from the old writ of
error, which has been abolished in most states today. Colorado
still retains the writ of error, both as to civil 61 and criminal 62
cases. Still other recommendations cover the record on appeal,
aimed primarily at reducing the cost of appeal, and, by making
appeal possible in some instances when it would otherwise be too
expensive, thus furthering the administration of justice. Thus,
typewritten records of court testimony should be permissible; the
papers and pleadings on file which are to be put in the record
need not be printed but may be used in their original form; and
printed abstracts should not be required. 63 Still further recom-
mendations call for a limitation on the length of briefs with no
more than a certain number of pages to be taxable as costs, and
the wider use of memorandum opinions when no new principle
of law is involved.
64
Just as there is a recommendation, discussed above under
"trial practice," that the trial judge be allowed after verdict to
give judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court
should have power to direct that verdict be entered for the defend-
ant, rather than simply power to remand for new trial, on appeal
by the defendant from the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict
of acquittal. The record may show not only that the trial judge
was wrong but what the correct judgment should be. This recom-
mended procedure is followed in Colorado in criminal cases.6 5
CIVIL RULES GIVE COLORADO HIGH STANDING
In a recent issue of the American Bar Association Journal,
the 48 states were compared as to how they measured up to the
association's minimum standards of judicial administration. 6 The
comparison was admittedly somewhat rough and ready, but it
does give some indication of Colorado's relative standing. Colo-
rado tied for fifth (along with Minnesota and New Hampshire)
behind New Jersey, California, Delaware and Wisconsin, in that
order. Two thoughts occur to me about Colorado's relatively high
showing. One is that the principal reason for such a showing is
60 See Johnson's articles in 25 DICTA on the Colorado Bar Association judiciary plan.
The Colorado legislature in the 1949 session failed to pass the proposal to amend the
judiciary article of the Colorado constitution, including the abolition of the justice
courts.
"' COLO. R. Civ. P. 111 (1941). See explanation for retention of the writ at 1 COLO.
STAT. ANN., p. 531 (1941).
6
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §§ 497-500 (1935).
63Colorado requires abstracts in both civil cases, COLO. R. CiV. P. 115 (1941), and
criminal, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 499 (1935), although sometimes the abstract may be
typewritten, COLO. R. Civ. P. 115 (1941).
64 The Colorado Supreme Court has no definite limit on length of briefs. It often
renders memorandum opinions, as recommended.
65 Matthews v. People, 89 Colo. 421. 3 P. 2d 409 (1931).
"Porter, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration: The Extent of Their Ac-
ceptance, 36 A.B.AJ. 614 (1950).
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Colorado's adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Her record
in the field of criminal procedure is not as good. The other thought
is that, while Colorado's standing is relatively high, it still falls
well-short of achieving the minimum standards discussed in this
article. In other words, it is not so much that Colorado is good as
that most of the other states are bad.
It seems to me obvious that Colorado should have a set of
modern, well-rounded, simply-stated Supreme Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure to take the place of the present confusing
array of scattered statutory provisions, court decisions, unwritten
practices, out-dated customs and general uncertainty. The changes
would be more of form than of substance, since most of the present
law of criminal procedure in Colorado is, once it has been found,
sensible enough. Some changes in substance can be made, however,
Colorado, as we have seen, does fall short of the "minimum stand-
ards" in a number of important respects. And some of the pro-
cedure not mentioned in the ABA proposals, but contained in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the American Law Insti-
tute Code, could well be adopted in Colorado.
PRACTICAL REFORM A VICTORY FOR DEMOCRACY
It should be noted once more that the American Bar Associa-
tion's minimum standards are not academic or experimental but
are realistic and practical. They were recommended by practical
men, most of them practicing attorneys. Many of the recommenda-
tions are now in successful use in a few or many jurisdictions.
They are not radical or revolutionary; "on the contrary, some of
the recommendations involve a return to common law concepts
that were unwisely abandoned a century or so ago by various states;
others represent the gradual advance in simple, common-sense
methods of judicial administration." 37
By choosing the legal profession for our life's work we law-
yers have dedicated ourselves to the principle of justice. We have
a duty, greater than have any other group in our society, to devote
ourselves to the pursuit of this elusive principle. It has always
been an important pursuit, but it is especially so today, when our
democratic way of life is matched, in the competition for men's
minds, with other forms of government. If our way is to win out
in the end, our administration of justice must be as nearly perfect
as we can make it. There must be a genuine respect for the law
and lawyers. We lawyers do not like to change our ways of doing
things any more than other people set in their ways. But, like
other segments of the population, we must be willing to make
some sacrifices in order to make certain the ultimate victory of
democratic institutions. The lawyers of Colorado, with their spe-
cial knowledge of procedure, should take the lead in improving
the administration of justice as a part of the larger fight against
anti-democratic forces.
67 VANDERBILT, Op. cit. note 1 8upra, at xxxi.
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